Since the 9/11 attacks, the United States and its Western allies have pursued a campaign against “Radical Islam”. But has this term become a misleading label that now conceals broader prejudice against Muslims? Is it time for the west to bury their fear, retribution and acts of revenge? Has the Western world merely adopted the very thing that it purports to be fighting against; “radicalisation” and worryingly, actually started breeding their very own Bogey Men?
Radical Islam: The American Perspective
The so-called “9/11” terror attacks in September 2001 were coordinated and carried out by al-Qaeda, an Islamist organisation. Nineteen hijackers seized four airliners: two struck New York’s Twin Towers, one hit the Pentagon, and the fourth crashed in Pennsylvania after passengers resisted. The bipartisan 9/11 Commission identified Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as the plot’s chief architect and concluded that Afghanistan-based Islamist extremists directed the attackers.
The attacks killed 2,996 people, including the 19 hijackers, and injured thousands. Those killed included 265 aboard the aircraft, 2,606 at and near the World Trade Centre, and 125 at the Pentagon, among them 343 firefighters, 72 law-enforcement officers and 55 military personnel. Victims came from more than 90 countries, and Ground Zero-related illnesses have since caused further deaths.
For the United States, 9/11 was both a profound shock and evidence of institutional failures. The 9/11 Commission found the country unprepared, although earlier attacks and intelligence had already signalled al-Qaeda’s intent to kill Americans on a large scale.
Subsequent Conspiracy Theories
The disaster’s scale, early confusion and distrust of government fuelled claims of controlled demolition, official foreknowledge and even that no hijacked aircraft struck the Pentagon. These theories should be distinguished from legitimate scrutiny of intelligence and policy failures. After reviewing structural, documentary and audiovisual evidence, the National Institute of Standards and Technology attributed the collapses to aircraft damage and fires and found no evidence of demolition. The 9/11 Commission separately reconstructed al-Qaeda’s plot and the hijackers’ movements. Although both investigations remain open to criticism, neither supports the principal “inside job” claims. Yet many still support the mostly debunked “false flag” claims.
Principal U.S. actions since 2001
The “War on Terror” begins: The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force authorised force against those responsible for 9/11 and those who harboured them. In October 2001, the United States invaded Afghanistan, invoking NATO’s Article 5, ousted the Taliban and pursued al-Qaeda until withdrawing in August 2021. Later administrations also conducted raids, air strikes and drone operations against al-Qaeda, Islamic State and affiliated groups in several countries; U.S. forces killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in 2011. The separately authorised 2003 invasion of Iraq was publicly linked to the “War on Terror”, although the 9/11 Commission found no evidence that Iraq directed the attacks.
Iraq’s WMD claims and subsequent inquiries: The central claim that Iraq possessed active stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons – so-called “Weapons of Mass Destruction” – was not borne out after the invasion. The CIA-led Iraq Survey Group found that the pre-war certainty about Saddam Hussein’s weapons had proved wrong. A 2004 U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee inquiry examined serious failures in pre-war intelligence, while its 2008 follow-up concluded that “several administration statements misrepresented or exceeded the underlying intelligence”. In Britain, the 2016 Iraq Inquiry found that judgements about Iraq’s capabilities were presented with “unjustified certainty”, peaceful options had not been exhausted and “post-invasion planning was inadequate.” These findings discredited the asserted WMD case for war and exposed major failures in intelligence assessment, political presentation and planning, although they did not show that every official knowingly fabricated the evidence.
Domestic security and law: The USA PATRIOT Act expanded investigative, surveillance and information-sharing powers. In 2002, the government created the Department of Homeland Security and the Transportation Security Administration, consolidating border, emergency and infrastructure functions and federalising passenger screening. Reinforced cockpits, watch lists and tighter passenger, cargo and visa checks strengthened aviation security. The FBI prioritised terrorism prevention, while bodies such as the National Counterterrorism Centre improved intelligence sharing. The Government Accountability Office reported substantial progress alongside persistent weaknesses and oversight challenges.
Intelligence, detention and civil liberties: The CIA and military expanded covert intelligence, targeted operations and foreign cooperation. Detention at Guantánamo and secret CIA prisons prompted disputes over enhanced interrogation, rendition, indefinite detention and warrantless surveillance. Later reforms strengthened oversight, but broad surveillance powers, the 2001 AUMF and Guantánamo remained contentious.
Financial, diplomatic and preventive measures: The United States froze assets, imposed sanctions, criminalised material support and required banks to flag suspicious transactions, while working through the UN and international coalitions. It also expanded biometric, border and aviation screening, foreign police training, intelligence sharing and programmes aimed at countering recruitment and violent extremism. Together, these measures combined diplomacy, aid, policing, intelligence, border security and disruption of terrorist finance.
Current administration (2025–26): The administration tightened immigration controls through stricter vetting, limits on asylum and humanitarian parole, renewed border-wall construction, increased detention and removals, “self-deportation”, local police cooperation and wider prosecutions. Entry and visa restrictions were extended, with limited exceptions, to nationals of 39 countries and holders of Palestinian Authority travel documents. Enforcement of the alien-registration requirement expanded to include fingerprinting and proof-of-registration rules. Disputed measures included using the Alien Enemies Act against alleged Tren de Aragua members, rapid removals, challenges to “sanctuary” jurisdictions, broad arrests and expanded detention without due process. Critics linked these actions to unwarranted deaths involving officials. The Supreme Court required notice and meaningful judicial review before removal under the Act, while a 2026 Government Accountability Office report found waste, poor planning and safety failures at ICE’s largest new detention centre. The administration presents these policies as necessary for border control and public safety; opponents warn that they erode due process, separate families, deter lawful asylum claims and disproportionately affect immigrant and Muslim communities. It has also continued operations against ISIS and al-Qaeda and expanded terrorist designations and sanctions. And started a war in Iran that is now effecting the whole world, because countries are impacted by the reduced flow of oil from Gulf States. But none of this even starts to consider the serious impacts on civilian life in those countries, where many women and children have arguably been targeted, or died as “collateral damage” in what many see as an imperialistic war, rather than a reasonable pre-emptive response to combat perceived and possible aggression… from the Islamic Bogey Man!
Summary: These measures weakened al-Qaeda and ISIS, strengthened potential targets and improved inter-agency coordination, but also prolonged wars, caused civilian casualties and displacement, imposed heavy public costs, and intensified disputes over legality, discrimination and civil liberties. Although U.S. policy formally targets violent organisations rather than Islam or Muslims generally, describing it as a campaign against “radical Islam” has blurred that distinction. Increasingly populist, right-wing and authoritarian rhetoric in America—and, to a lesser extent, Europe—continues to harm Muslim communities across the West. Despite the real impacts of “Radical Islam” – like any other “radical ideology” – in reality, there is no “Islamic Bogey Man”, despite how some on the far-right of politics like to conveniently portray that myth.
Radical Islam: UK Perspective
As a NATO ally, the UK followed the United States into the “War on Terror”—a decision that arguably harmed Britain and several of its European allies.
Islamist terrorism in the UK: MI5 identifies Islamist terrorism as the country’s principal terrorism threat by volume, while stressing that it investigates threats from every ideology. Major examples include the 7 July 2005 London bombings, in which four suicide attackers killed 52 people on the transport network; the 2013 murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby in Woolwich; the 2017 Westminster and London Bridge attacks; the Manchester Arena bombing, which killed 22 people; the 2019 Fishmongers’ Hall attack; and the 2021 murder of Sir David Amess MP. These crimes were committed by individuals or small networks influenced by jihadist ideology and do not represent British Muslims generally. The government’s CONTEST strategy recorded nine declared terrorist attacks in the UK between 2018 and July 2023 and 39 late-stage plots disrupted from March 2017.
Response and scrutiny: Britain’s CONTEST framework combines Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare: police and MI5 disrupt plots, Prevent and Channel seek early intervention, protective-security measures reduce vulnerability, and emergency services prepare for attacks. Subsequent scrutiny has exposed shortcomings. Parliament’s review of the 7 July attacks examined what intelligence agencies knew before the bombings, while the Manchester Arena Inquiry identified missed opportunities within the security system, inadequate venue security and serious weaknesses in the emergency response. A 2025 review of Prevent also found that intervention had failed in the cases of Sir David Amess’s killer and the Southport attacker, although the latter was not found to have a clear terrorist ideology. These findings show both the continuing danger posed by Islamist terrorism and the limits of prevention, intelligence-sharing and institutional preparedness.
A catalyst for Islamophobia: Anjem Choudary—once widely described as the “face” of militant Islamism or Britain’s “best-known” Islamic extremist—was sentenced to life imprisonment for directing a terrorist organisation. Before the British criminal justice system finally silenced him, however, he had remained largely free to spread his divisive hatred at every opportunity for more than 25 years.
The Wall Street Journal described him as a supporter of Salafism, “the fundamentalist strain of Islamic teaching.” Choudary asserted Islam’s supremacy over all other faiths and called for Sharia law to be implemented in full across the UK. Choudary had been the leader of Islam4UK, a radical Islamist group that was proscribed as a terrorist organisation under UK counterterrorism law in January 2010. On its website, Islam4UK said it had been established by “sincere Muslims” to promote “the supreme Islamic ideology within the United Kingdom as a divine alternative to man-made law.” It also sought to persuade the British public of Islam’s superiority, shift public opinion in its favour, transfer authority and power to Muslims, and implement Sharia law in Britain.
In 2010, British Muslim Guardian contributor Mehdi Hasan challenged Choudary’s authority: “Is Choudary an Islamic scholar whose views merit attention or consideration? No. Has he studied under leading Islamic scholars? Nope. Does he have any Islamic qualifications or credentials? None whatsoever. So what gives him the right to pontificate on Islam, British Muslims or ‘the hellfire’? Or proclaim himself a ‘sharia judge’?” Hasan argued that Choudary was “as unrepresentative of British Muslim opinion as he is of British anti-war opinion.” In 2019, Turkish-British journalist and New York Times staff reporter Ceylan Yeğinsu wrote, “It is hard to overstate the role Mr. Choudary has played in motivating Islamic extremists.”
On 30 July 2024, Mr Justice Wall sentenced Choudary at Woolwich Crown Court to life imprisonment, with a minimum term of 28 years. His appeal was dismissed in March 2026. Even so, the UK has generally addressed “radical Islam” through a measured response grounded in legal and moral principles. The irony is that Choudary may have done more than almost anyone to intensify the very problems he claimed to oppose.
However, Britain’s largely uncritical use of “Islamic Bogey Man” rhetoric has fuelled right-wing populism, hardened immigration debate and encouraged anti-Muslim activism. Examples include English Defence League-style marches, campaigns against mosques and asylum accommodation, and unrest after the 2024 Southport murders, when false claims about the attacker contributed to assaults on mosques, asylum hotels and police. A subsequent HMICFRS inspection examined the role of misinformation and extremist mobilisation. Home Office figures also recorded a 19% rise in religious hate crimes against Muslims in the year ending March 2025, including a spike around the Southport murders and subsequent disorder. And now, in 2026, we are witnessing the rise and “mobilisation” of organisations like “Raise the Flags” and “Patriotic Platform” taking to the streets on mass, as they target Muslims and/or people with brown skin. So-called “Christian Nationalists” displaying traits of “White-Supremacy” draped in black shirts and black balaclavas under National flag patriotism, whilst spouting about their tenets and totems of perceived British morality.
Yet Britain is not alone when it comes to the emboldened and overt displays of “Radical Patriotism” – our latest social “Bogey Man” – which now also needs to be defeated.
Radical Islam: Italian Perspective
In September 2026, social-media posts claimed that Italian authorities had again taken “strong action” against “radical Islam” by deporting Zulfiqar Khan, a Pakistani-born imam in Bologna who had been a registered Italian resident since 1995 (HERE). However, viral assertions that Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni had “personally deported him within 24 hours” because he urged Muslims to “fight the infidels” combined reported facts with inferred—or fabricated—details that had not been clearly established.
Some reports said Italy’s Interior Ministry viewed Khan as a “potential threat to public order and national security” after examining speeches the authorities considered “increasingly radical.” His reported statements included “strong anti-Western rhetoric” and “comments supportive of Hamas after the October 7 attacks” in Israel. Italian authorities reportedly described his rhetoric as reflecting growing “ideological fanaticism.”
Khan’s alleged praise for the martyrdom of Hamas fighters in the Israel–Hamas war was not, by itself, necessarily radical. However, his reported discriminatory remarks about gay people and women in his sermons were, and by all accounts, deeply offensive. He was also accused of encouraging resistance to Italian tax laws, calling for divine punishment against Western states that supported Israel, and maintaining contacts with radical Islamists. On 10 October 2024, Giorgia Meloni’s government signed a decree ordering Khan’s deportation on public-order grounds. He was reportedly deported almost two years later—not within 24 hours, as some far-right activists had implied.
Thousands protest across Italy against detention of imam over Palestine comments: Activists say the government’s move to deport Mohamed Shahin is linked to a hostile portrayal of Muslim men by Italian media. (2025, Dalia Ismail, Freelance reporter hyphenonline.com)
Such action was not, however, unprecedented in Italy. In September 2005, the country had previously expelled Moroccan-born imam Bourki Bouchta (HERE), saying that “he represented a danger to public security.” He was taken from his home in Turin early one morning and flown to Morocco. Italian authorities said they were “considering taking similar measures against other foreigners in Italy.”
In April 2026, Italy expelled another Pakistani-born imam (HERE) after he provoked widespread outrage by citing the Qur’an to justify the marriage of young girls. The Italian newspaper Il Giornale reported that Paolo Sartori, police commissioner of Brescia—described as Italy’s “Islamic capital”—ordered Ali Kashif’s deportation after Kashif told a reporter for the television programme Fuori dal Coro that girls could marry after their first menstrual period.
It is also important to note that Italy is governed by an administration widely regarded as “far-right” (see here). The country has a long history of right-wing politics, populist rhetoric and authoritarian rule. Indeed, fascism’s origins are as distinctly Italian as spaghetti carbonara or pizza. Perhaps the words of Benito Mussolini still ring true in some Italian ears: “Democracy is beautiful in theory; in practice it is a fallacy.”
Radical Islam: German Perspective
Germany, though often less vocal than some neighbours, has also experienced the tragedy of Islamist terrorism. Examples include the failed 2006 suitcase-bomb plot on regional trains; the 2016 Berlin Christmas-market attack; fatal stabbings in Dresden in 2020 and Duisburg in 2023; and the 2024 Solingen festival attack, which killed three people and injured eight. Authorities have also disrupted Islamic State- and al-Qaeda-linked plots targeting public transport and Christmas markets. In 2025, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution estimated the country’s Islamist extremist milieu at 28,645 people, including 9,110 considered violence-oriented, while distinguishing extremism from Islam and Germany’s wider Muslim population. However, possibly in an attempt to atone for their national behaviour during world war two, Germany has, until now at least, generally been far more accommodating to foreigners when it comes to issues around population diversity and inclusion.
2011 German Patriotism: A Fresh Start – “Patriotism in Germany has been a taboo topic since the time of Adolf Hitler, with the vast majority of Germans accepting that they cannot express any form of national pride”. (Knowledge-Wharton)
Germany has a large – predominantly Muslim – Turkish population, and until lately, they have mostly been at the forefront of migration acceptance and support for refugees in Europe. Yet German politicians have long wrestled with questions surrounding their country’s Turkish population. Critics argue that limited integration has fostered parallel communities, while proposals to promote integration through education or legal measures have repeatedly stirred controversy. These tensions have also intensified increasingly hostile debates over German identity and the so-called “Turkish question”.
The “Bogey Man” narrative has eroded Germany’s post WWII tradition of tolerance and diversity, while recent election results also suggest that far-right populism is again gaining ground. For some observers, this revival evokes disturbing echoes of Germany’s authoritarian past—an especially troubling development in a country where memories of the Third Reich and a lingering sense of historical “war guilt” still shapes public life. Yet now one really should be wondering; how much time is left before the “Herrenvolk” are once again required to carry “Ariernachweis” papers?
Radical Islam: French Perspective
Despite their common trait for vocal and mass public responses to societal issues, the impact of Islamist terrorism has also been felt across France. The problem brought names such as Charlie Hebdo and the Bataclan into political debate across Europe.
On 7 January 2015, gunmen linked to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula killed 12 people at and near Charlie Hebdo’s Paris offices, an attack widely understood as targeting freedom of expression; related attacks over the following two days killed five more people, including four hostages at a kosher supermarket. On 13 November, Islamic State-directed attackers struck the Stade de France, Paris cafés and restaurants, and the Bataclan, killing 130 people and injuring hundreds. These events intensified mainstream political debate over security, secularism, integration, antisemitism and relations with French Muslim communities. France subsequently declared a state of emergency, expanded surveillance and administrative powers, strengthened intelligence coordination and later incorporated some exceptional measures into ordinary law.
An official chronology of French counterterrorism legislation records this expansion, while a Council of State review warned that emergency powers require clear limits and effective judicial and parliamentary scrutiny. However, the threat has persisted: in March 2025, the French government reported 50 Islamist terrorist attacks since 2012, causing 274 deaths and more than 800 injuries, while stressing that Islamist extremism must not be conflated with Islam or France’s Muslim population generally. Any attempts at defeating “The Bogey Man” have clearly required a more nuanced approach, and one that probably should not be confined to dealing with anti-Islamic rhetoric alone.
Radical Islam: Scandinavian Perspective
Nordic countries have also faced Islamist terrorism and related security threats. Denmark’s 2015 Copenhagen shootings targeted a free-speech event and a synagogue; its security service, PET, continues to assess militant Islamism as the country’s main terrorist threat. Sweden experienced the 2010 Stockholm bombing and the 2017 truck attack in central Stockholm, which killed five people. After Quran burnings and hostile propaganda increased tensions, Sweden raised its threat level to “high” in 2023; it was lowered to “elevated” in 2025, but the Swedish Security Service’s 2026 assessment still identified lone violent Islamists and violent right-wing extremists as the principal threats. Norway has likewise confronted Islamist plots and attacks, including the 2010 Oslo bombing plot and the 2022 Oslo shooting; the Norwegian Police Security Service continues to monitor Islamist extremism alongside far-right and anti-government violence. These cases show that the regional threat is real but varied, and should not be conflated with Islam or Nordic Muslim communities generally.
Radical Islam: a convenient label for nefarious actors
I am not suggesting for one minute that extreme radicalism should go unchallenged—far from it. Or that it doesn’t need to have every appropriate tool available used to defeat it. However, efforts to counter extremist views should never come from a knee-jerk reaction designed to appease public opinion, or be something that is shaped within social-media echo chambers. Yet often they are.
Khan’s case, in Italy, like many others across Europe (and the world), undoubtedly intensified Europe’s wider debate again over immigration, social integration, religious freedom, extremism, and public safety in an increasingly diverse society that seeks to remain inclusive. Freedom of religion and peaceful expression are fundamental democratic rights, while incitement to violence or support for terrorism can—and should—carry legal consequences when proven through evidence and due process rather than public outrage. Yet far-right activists have once again deployed the label “radical Islamist” as a weapon to shape ill-informed opinion.
However, “radical Islamism” should be understood within the wider spectrum of Islamist religious and political movements. Encyclopaedia Britannica defines Islamism as a broad and diverse set of political ideologies that draw on Islamic traditions in pursuit of sociopolitical objectives; their aims and interpretations vary widely. Although many Islamist movements hold that Islam should play a major role in politics, it is disingenuous (and dangerous) to treat Islamism as a single doctrine, or to assume that Islamist views are shared by all Muslims. However, survey evidence would also suggest that a simple majority–minority belief claim is weak: Pew Research Centre found that support for sharia – as an official law – ranged from 8% in Azerbaijan and 12% in Turkey to 84% in South Asia and 99% in Afghanistan, with supporters also differing over how Islamic laws should be applied. As with Jewish views of Israel’s actions in Palestine, attitudes among Muslims toward religion and politics are diverse rather than uniform.
One person’s actions or statements should not be used to judge an entire religion, nationality, or immigrant community. Nevertheless, such generalisations remain common on social media, on television, and in the rhetoric of politicians once seen as more moderate than those at the political extremes. Khan was not the first Islamic cleric expelled from Italy—or elsewhere in Europe—in recent years, and he is unlikely to be the last.
Far-Right Radicalism: Burgeoning and Exponential Growth
Legitimate concerns about migration’s effects on housing, jobs and public services have often been met with policies perceived as ineffective. Evidence supports both the concern and the need for nuance: the Autumn 2024 Eurobarometer ranked migration as the EU’s second-highest medium-term priority, cited by 29% of respondents, while Spring 2024 polling found that 67% supported a common migration policy and 56% believed immigrants contributed positively to their country. The European Commission’s Joint Research Centre also found that migration debate is often shaped by simplified, misleading narratives, even as citizens raise genuine concerns about jobs and public resources.
When governments fail to address those concerns clearly and effectively, rhetoric can displace evidence and encourage people to blame a convenient “enemy”. As a direct result of sociopolitical policy failures amongst various European governments – fuelled by American rhetoric – the worrying return to the German and Italian uprisings of the 1930s, were almost predictable. Those political ‘failures’ mean that we are now facing a burgeoning growth of far-right leaning nationalistic ideologies. Because “Radical Islam”, which was once a partly understandable response to Western imperialism and control, has since morphed into the “Radical Nationalism” and “White Supremacy” mobilised activism that we increasingly witness today. The “underdog” in a “minority” will only accept being treated as such for a finite period, before it rises up and starts to bite back.
Navigating the Fragility of Democratic Humanity
As inclusive democratic institutions fracture in America, Germany, the UK and elsewhere, and populist authoritarianism rooted in bigotry and hatred gains ground, I cannot be alone in feeling deeply concerned. As a student of history, though not an academic expert, I worry that many people either fail to recognise or choose to ignore echoes from our past. I therefore find myself desperately clinging to hope and to a worn collection of once-comforting mantras and insights from people far wiser than me. Because, as someone – can’t remember who – once pointed out; when you lack hope you are left with nothing.
“We must accept finite disappointment but never lose infinite hope.” (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
Desmond Tutu: As time passes, I increasingly agree with Tutu that “As human beings we have the most extraordinary capacity for evil. We can perpetrate some of the most horrendous atrocities”—and we do. Yet I also share his belief that “We are each made for goodness, love and compassion. Our lives are transformed as much as the world is when we live with these truths.” Like Tutu, I always hold onto hope because “Hope is being able to see that there is light despite all of the darkness.”
Albert Einstein: Einstein urged us to “Learn from yesterday, live for today, [and] hope for tomorrow”, yet we rarely do. We often rush towards solutions before understanding the problems themselves. His reminder that “The important thing is not to stop questioning” remains vital, because otherwise we may overlook what is before us: “We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them.” His wry observation that “Only two things are infinite, the universe and human stupidity” still troubles me—and, like him, “I’m not sure about the former.”
Dalai Lama: When writing about social problems, I often return to his warning that an extreme self-centred attitude creates “isolation”, followed by “loneliness, fear, anger”, and becomes “the source of suffering”. Persistent self-interest has eroded our empathy for others. His advice is simple: “If you can, help others; if you cannot do that, at least do not harm them.” Until we understand our place within humanity, we will keep compounding our problems and dissatisfaction, for “Where ignorance is our master, there is no possibility of real peace.”
Epictetus: Discovering Stoic philosophy profoundly changed my life. It is remarkable that words written thousands of years ago remain so relevant. To understand them, however, we must accept that “It is impossible to begin to learn that which one thinks one already knows.” We should also remember that “To accuse others for one’s own misfortunes is a sign of want of education. To accuse oneself shows that one’s education has begun. To accuse neither oneself nor others shows that one’s education is complete.” Ultimately, I keep returning to my tried and tested psychological life preserver from Stoic Philosophy;
“There is only one way to happiness and that is to cease worrying about things which are beyond the power of our will.” (Epictetus)
